05-25 D-Day question of the day

[franksolich]

Okay, now remember, this is a professional civilian writing this.

I've been to Normandy, and saw a lot of things, but as I was young and green, I really had no idea what I was seeing; just the vague notion that I was standing in the presence of something pleasing to God.

I have a whole lot of questions about D-Day, and guess I'll ask them one each day, until June 6.

The first one is the beaches on Normandy.  There were five of them, Sword, Juno, Gold, Omaha, and Utah.  The British and Canadians dealt with the first three, the Americans with the following two.

Omaha Beach is generally considered the roughest place to have been; it was a really close-run thing, and just as likely to fail as to succeed.

So my question.

Would it not have been more practical to land on the other four beaches, avoiding Omaha Beach altogether, and then squeezing that gap between the beaches, as if a pimple?

Would that have worked?

Or were military strategists unaware of all of the hazards and perils of Omaha?

[franksolich]

Also posted here, in case anyone is interested in what the military pros at freerepublic have to say:

http://www.freerepublic.c...s/f-vetscor/2258049/posts

[dutch508]

You have to look beyond the beaches. The objectives of the landings were not the beaches, but what was beyond them.

[franksolich]

You have to look beyond the beaches. The objectives of the landings were not the beaches, but what was beyond them.

Man, I'm really pleased with the responses over at freerepublic; I'm picking up a lot of good stuff, and good stuff from people who know what they're talking about.

However, in one sense, your response, dutch, fellow Nebraskan, sir, is perhaps more what I was grasping at.  I know nothing about strategic thinking, much less strategic planning.  Credit this to that I never played competitive games as a lad, and so never, really, developed any sort of thinking along strategic lines.

It had never occurred to me to take into consideration something such as "what was beyond" the initial goals.

Sometimes I feel like an utter retard, and am suprised Thor hasn't kicked me out of here yet, for rampant displays of stupidity.

[FGL]

Thats the kind of stuff I watch the History and Military channels for.

[franksolich]

Thats the kind of stuff I watch the History and Military channels for.

Alas, that's what creates a gap in my line of reasoning; I have to go merely by what I read.

Many on freerepublic mentioned various war movies, but I've never watched a war movie in my life.  I've caught sporadic few-second-glimpses of war movies, old and new, and old news-reels, but as they meant nothing to me, given the absence of sound, I then just went on to something else.

So whatever I know, I know only from books.

[DumbAss Tanker]

Dutch is quite correct, as usual, and the "Why" is often missing from historical documentaries which tend to concentrate on the "Human interest story" and consequent need to find heroes and villains instead of just giving a complete and accurate picture of events.  Thing is, there was no particular reason to be aware in advance that German resistance would be stiffer at one beach over the other, and once the assault goes in, you are pretty locked in to seeing it through, even if it becomes evident the price of success is going to be a lot higher than the estimate.  The difficulty of disengagement and retreat while in close contact is legendary and produces additional very large casualty numbers on top of what you've already suffered getting to that decision point, for NOTHING, so generally in amphibious assault withdrawal is only a real consideration if it appears success has actually become impossible.  A lot has been made of Eisenhower preparing a withdrawal message, but I don't think it was really in the cards, just preparation for a contingency.  It would have been a total ball-buster for morale, even with the other four landings achieving objectives and eventually outflanking the German defenses on Omaha.     

[Eupher]

As I understand it, and going from memory alone, Bradley was operational commander of Omaha Beach and very nearly did give the order to withdraw from Omaha altogether. Utah, further west, was having far better success as were the Brits and Canadians further east.

Lots of things plagued Omaha in particular. The pre-invasion bombing was essentially useless against those fortifications (the Atlantic Wall was a real PITA); the offloaded amphibious armor swamped in the heavy seas after having been launched too soon; the terrain favored the defenders, who were beefed up by units that had just moved in the area; and the low tide left a lot of beach for the defenders to machine-gun, mortar, and bomb at will -- at least for awhile.

The causeways in back of the beaches were valuable and securing them was the mission of the airborne, simply to keep the Germans from throwing the invasion force back into the sea. Most of the land in back of the beaches had been flooded and the causeways provided the only means to move.

Had Bradley given the order to evacuate/abandon Omaha, there's no question that Utah would've been maximized, along with the westernmost Brit beach - Gold, I think.

The thrust into the Atlantic Wall could not have a segment of it unsecured - that's tantamount to the classic "leaving your flanks unsecured" tactic which is an invitation to a lot of headache. So the broad front needed to be broad enough to facilitate the landing of so many thousands of troops, their supply trains, and other support.

Omaha, in the end, needed to be taken. Thanks to naval gunfire and good leadership, it got taken by the end of the day.

[DumbAss Tanker]

Thanks to naval gunfire and good leadership, it got taken by the end of the day.

Naval gunfire was an overwhelming advantage in US amphib operations.  With air superiority, nothing could really stand up to it for long, and by the Normandy landings, we were past air superiority and almost at air dominance.  Look at what happened at Salerno, where even with elite mechanized forces (Which were not available to the German defensive zone commanders at Utah or Omaha) and superior forces the Axis could not crush the beachhead because nothing that came within sight of the bombardment ships could survive the pummeling that would immediately ensue.

The one amphib op that was a dismal failure was Dieppe, but it was a large scale raid which was never intended to create a permanent lodgment.  It was also quite poorly-planned and executed, not well-resourced, and lacked the air superiority necessary to let bombardment ships close to point-blank range (If there had been a good bombardment plan with sufficient ships committed to it in the first place, that is).